How are the welfare costs from monopoly borne? We answer this question in the context of the U.S. credit card industry, which is highly concentrated, charges interest rates that are 3.4 to 8.8 percentage points above competitive pricing, generates excess profits, and has repeatedly lost antitrust lawsuits. We depart from existing consumer credit models that assume perfect competition (e.g. Livshits, Tertilt (2007, 2010) and Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ríos-Rull (2007)), by integrating oligopolistic lenders into a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari framework. Our model accounts for roughly half of the spreads and excess profits observed in the data. The welfare gains to the current population from competitive reforms in the credit card industry are equivalent to a onetime transfer to households worth 3.4 percent of GDP. Along the transition path, all cohorts realize welfare gains from competitive reforms. Asset poor households benefit the most from increased consumption smoothing. Asset rich households also benefit from higher general equilibrium saving interest rates.
Introduction
The long standing view that the dead weight losses from monopoly are small, e.g. Harberger (1954) 's study of American manufacturing in the 1920s, has been dispelled repeatedly (see a summary of arguments by Schmitz (2012) ). Recent work by Schmitz (2016) has argued that across a number of industries, the costs of monopoly are large and disproportionately borne by low-income households. We contribute to this literature by integrating oligopolistic lenders into a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari framework and quantifying the distribution of welfare losses resulting from non-competitive behavior in the credit card industry. We find that both low-income households and high income households suffer significant welfare losses from the credit card monopoly.
The U.S. credit card industry is highly concentrated, generates excess profits, and charges interest rates that are 3.4 to 8.8 percentage points above competitive pricing. The Justice Department, Federal Trade Commission, and private parties have repeatedly won antitrust lawsuits against the U.S. credit card industry. To measure the welfare consequences of competitive reforms in the credit card industry, we depart from existing consumer credit models, which typically assume competitive, zero-profit lenders (e.g. Tertilt (2007, 2010) and Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ríos-Rull (2007) ), and we develop a model with a finite number of credit card firms that imperfectly compete to issue non-exclusive credit lines. We estimate that the gains from competitive credit market conditions as opposed to 2016 credit market conditions are equivalent to a 2 percent increase in lifetime consumption or a one-time transfer worth 3.4 percent of GDP to U.S. consumers. During the transition from 2016 credit market competition to a competitive credit market, all current cohorts of consumers and newborn cohorts of consumers realize significant welfare gains. We find that the poorest U.S. households gain the most because they are better able to smooth consumption with more competitive credit markets. Moreover, the richest households gain from greater interest rates on savings due to general equilibrium effects.
We begin by documenting several features of the U.S. credit card industry. First, the credit card market is characterized by a large degree of market concentration. Nine credit card issuers (mainly banks such as Citigroup, JP Morgan, Capital One, and Bank of America) accounted for 86 percent of outstanding revolving credit in 2016. These issuers founded and jointly own (to varying degrees) the main payment networks, Visa and Mastercard. Visa and Mastercard control two-thirds of the payment network market as measured by credit card purchase volume. Second, even after adjusting for rewards programs and other credit card fees, credit card issuers charge interest rates that are on average 3.4 to 8.8 percentage points above an interest rate that would yield zero profits. A consequence of these large spreads is abnormal profits. Estimates from Ausubel (1991) and Grodzicki (2017) show that the average rate of return on assets for the largest 25 credit card banks are 5.0 to 7.3 percentage points higher than that of the whole banking industry. 1 Third, the credit card industry has been the subject of numerous antitrust lawsuits since its inception. In 2005, the main credit card issuing banks and payment networks were sued for collusion; they lost the case in 2018 and were required to pay billions in penalties. The second half of the lawsuit (in progress) is mandating changes to the industry to promote competition. In 2017, new litigation alleges collusion between the main credit card issuing banks and payment networks to block entry.
To measure the welfare gains and losses associated with a non-competitive credit card industry, we build on a small but innovative class of models that explicitly model credit card lenders' market power (e.g. Wasmer and Weil (2004) , Drozd and Nosal (2008) , Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) , Galenianos and Nosal (2016) , Herkenhoff (2017) , Raveendranathan (2018) ). These environments maintain the assumptions of atomistic lenders, free-entry, and zero ex-ante profits. We depart from these frameworks by developing a general equilibrium production economy in which a finite number of non-atomistic credit card firms strategically compete for customers. We build a dynamic model of Stackelberg oligopoly in which credit card lenders sequentially compete on the interest rates and limits of their credit lines. We estimate the model to match 1970 and 2016 credit market conditions. Our benchmark non-competitive model accounts for roughly half of the observed spreads, profits, and charge-off rates in the credit card industry in both 1970 and 2016.
To illustrate our benchmark model's mechanisms, we first measure the welfare gains of replacing the regional monopolies that prevailed in the absence of interstate banking during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s with oligopolies. In 1970, the gains to U.S. consumers of a transition from a credit card monopoly to a credit card duopoly are equivalent to a 1 percent increase in lifetime consumption. During the transition from monopolist to duopolist lenders, almost every consumer is weakly better off. General equilibrium effects generate gains that are larger along the transition path than when comparing steady states. The increase in the borrowing limit allows consumers to delay default, which implies that credit card firms' profits remain positive during the transition. The aggregate gains to contemporary cohorts are equivalent to a onetime transfer worth 1 percent of GDP. If we decompose the aggregate gains, then the gains to consumers in the lowest deciles of the earnings and wealth distributions are equivalent to a one time transfer worth 1.22 and 1.26 percent of GDP per capita, respectively. Low-income and low-wealth consumers benefit from the ability to borrow more at a cheaper rate. The gains to those in the highest deciles of the earnings and wealth distributions are equivalent to a onetime transfer worth 1.27 and 1.60 percent of GDP per capita, respectively. High-income and high-wealth consumers benefit from a higher savings interest in general equilibrium. The consumers in the middle deciles of the earnings and wealth distributions are also better off, but they do not benefit as much from the ability to borrow more at a cheaper rate or from the higher savings interest rate.
We then estimate the welfare gains from competitive reforms in an oligopolistic version of the model calibrated to 2016 credit market conditions. While credit markets have become more competitive over time (e.g. Grodzicki (2017) ), our competition assumptions well approximate the current 2016 credit market. We consider less competitive calibrations with a lender duopoly or triopoly (approximating the fact that the top three credit card issuing banks control half of the market and have repeatedly colluded with the top three payment networks), as well as a more competitive oligopoly calibration with six lenders (an approximation to the fact that the top six credit card issuing banks control three-quarters of the market). Consumers have welfare gains worth 2 percent of lifetime consumption if we replace the oligopolists with competitive lenders. The aggregate gains to contemporary cohorts are equivalent to a onetime transfer worth 3.4 percent of GDP. The gains to consumers in the lowest deciles of the earnings and wealth distributions are equivalent to a one time transfer of 6.66 and 6.83 percent of GDP per capita, respectively. The gains to those in the highest deciles of the earnings and wealth distributions are equivalent to a onetime transfer of 5.23 and 7.06 percent of GDP per capita, respectively. Similar to the 1970s reform, low-income and low-wealth consumers benefit from the ability to borrow more at a cheaper rate, and savers now receive a higher interest rate because of general equilibrium effects. Because of the significant expansion of limits and lowering of borrowing rates, we find that this reform is Pareto improving both across steady states as well as along the transition path.
Our paper is related to competitive consumer credit models (Livshits et al. (2007 (Livshits et al. ( , 2010 and Chatterjee et al. (2007) ) as well as recent models that generate lender market power via search and bargaining (e.g. Wasmer and Weil (2004) , Drozd and Nosal (2008) , Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013), Galenianos and Nosal (2016) , Herkenhoff (2017) , Raveendranathan (2018) ). What makes the search models of the credit market tractable are the assumptions of atomistic lenders, free entry, and a small open economy. We contribute to this literature by developing a general equilibrium model of credit market oligopoly.
Another class of models relates improvements in screening technology to greater credit access and greater competition in the credit market (e.g. Livshits et al. (2016) , Sánchez (2018) , and Grodzicki (2017) ). While early contributions such as Ausubel (1991) document a lack of competition in the credit market throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Grodzicki (2017) makes a strong empirical argument that there has been an increase in competition in the credit market recently (Drozd and Nosal (2008) and Galenianos and Nosal (2016) also argue that reductions in entry costs -and thus increased competition-are quantitatively consistent with the rise in debt and defaults from the 1980s to the 1990s).
In our framework, as additional oligopolists enter the credit market (i.e. moving from monopoly and duopoly in the 1970s to oligopoly in the 2000s), our competitive structure endogenously generates increases in pass-through rates, credit limits, and credit access that likely complemented screening technology improvements. We contribute to this literature by developing a quantitative model of credit market oligopoly and showing that the welfare gains from competitive reforms in both the 1970s and 2000s are significant despite more competition.
Our paper relates to theoretic and quantitative models of credit lines (Drozd and Nosal (2008) , Mateos-Planas and Seccia (2006) , Mateos-Planas and Seccia (2013), Drozd and Serrano-Padial (2013) , Drozd and Serrano-Padial (2017) , and Braxton et al. (2018) ). Both Drozd and Nosal (2008) and Braxton et al. (2018) have incorporated long-term credit lines into models with imperfect competition (via search and bargaining) in the credit market. Others, including Hatchondo and Martinez (2018) , have modeled multiple credit lines. Our contribution to this literature is to incorporate non-exclusive credit lines into a dynamic oligopoly model of the credit market.
Competition in the U.S. credit card industry
We briefly discuss a narrative history of competition in the early credit card industry (late 1950s and early 1960s) largely based on Evans and Schmalensee (2005) , and then we turn to contemporary and historical indicators of competition in the credit card industry.
Historical background
During its inception in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the credit card industry was characterized by regional monopolies. While systematic evidence on interest rate dispersion and pricing is not available, scholars who have studied the beginning of the credit card industry describe a highly non-competitive (and very 'cooperative') environment. In particular, Evans and Schmalensee (2005) document that the early years of the credit card industry were characterized by limited competition. Visa's predecessor, BankAmericard, was founded in California and only began franchising the program to other banks in 1966. Part of the franchise was the restriction that banks could only issue Visa cards, which severely limited competition and prompted several antitrust suits in the early 1970s. American Express, which to that point was only a travel and entertainment card, began its own credit card program via franchising (it would later exit the credit card market and only return 20 years later). The predecessor to Mastercard was a 'cooperative' of banks which began expanding around the same time period. Nonetheless, the programs were highly regionally concentrated: American express was concentrated in New York, New England, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania (Evans and Schmalensee (2005) , p. 62), whereas BankAmericard was concentrated in the West. The Interbank Card Association, which is the predecessor to Mastercard, included banks primarily in the Midwest (Evans and Schmalensee (2005) , p. 63 ). The lack of competition among these groups of banks, and the lack of distinction between payment networks and banks, resulted in several high profile antitrust lawsuits. Notably in 1971, Visa was sued for antitrust violations stemming from its exclusionary contracts with member banks (Evans and Schmalensee (2005) , p. 70). Toward the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, banks became dual issuers of Visa and Mastercard products, and competition increased (regional monopolies to oligopoly).
Indicators of competitiveness
We document the following features of the credit card industry: (i) it is highly concentrated, (ii) even after adjusting for rewards programs and other credit card fees, credit card issuers charge interest rates that exceed zero-profit interest rates, (iii) credit card issuing banks have excess returns, and (iv) the credit card industry has been sued repeatedly for antitrust violations from inception until present.
The first defining feature of the credit card industry is the large degree of market concentration. We measure market concentration of both credit card issuers (e.g. banks such as Citigroup, JP Morgan, Capital One, Bank of America) and credit card payment networks (e.g. Visa, Mastercard, and American Express). Table 1 shows that three credit card issuers accounted for roughly half of outstanding revolving credit in 2016, and nine credit card issuers accounted for 86 percent of outstanding revolving credit in 2016. Table  2 shows that three payment networks (Visa, American Express, Master Card) accounted for 96 percent of credit card purchase volume in 2016. The issuing banks founded and still jointly own (to varying degrees) the main payment networks, Visa and Mastercard, whereas American Express is a vertically integrated issuer and payment network. Since issuers own significant portions of the payment networks, and, as we will discuss below, the payment networks and issuers have been repeatedly sued for colluding, it is difficult to draw the line between these institutions. Whether the effective number of competitors in the credit card market is nine issuing banks or three collusive issuer-payment networks is not clear. We will consider both cases in our quantitative analysis.
The second defining feature of the credit card industry is high interest rate spreads. To measure how far the credit card industry is from competitive pricing, we will focus on what we call excess spreads. We compute excess spreads as the difference between the actual spread and the zero-profit spread. The actual spread (τ actual ) is the difference between the (cross-sectional) average credit card interest rate and the Moody's Aaa rate. The zero-profit spread is defined as the spread that credit card firms should charge on interest income to break-even. It is computed as follows: let τ zero denote zero-profit spread, D charge-off rate, B outstanding revolving credit, r Moody's Aaa rate, and τ o transition cost net of non-interest income. τ o is computed as (operational cost + rewards and fraud -fees income -interchange income)/outstanding revolving credit. Operational cost and rewards and fraud refer to total cost and fees income and interchange income refer to non-interest income. 2 Given D, B, r, and τ o , the zero-profit spread is estimated from the following break-even equation:
The left hand side of (1) is total interest income net of charge-offs and the right hand side is total cost net of non-interest income. Table 3 presents the average excess spreads for the case without transaction costs net of non-interest income (τ o = 0) 2 Visa and Mastercard control two-thirds of the payment network market as measured by credit card purchase volume, and they earn profits from network fees (also called credit association fees) that are typically 0.5 percent of transaction volume. Visa and Mastercard also set a separate fee called an interchange fee. Interchange fees are directly paid to the issuer banks and are typically equal to 1.5 to 3.0 percent of the transaction price. 3 These interchange fees are tied to the generosity of the rewards program that the issuing banks choose. Cards that provide greater rewards can charge higher interchange fees. Since banks that choose to offer rewards can charge more interchange fees (which are borne by merchants who sell goods and accept credit card payments), reward cards do not yield lower profits to issuer banks (merchants are typically not allowed to price discriminate by card, although recent legal changes have relaxed these rules). Hence, by construction of the interchange fees, rewards do not lower the excess profits and excess spreads of issuers. and for the case with transactions costs net of non-interest income. For the latter, we use τ o = −0.052, which is an estimate from Agarwal et al. (2015) . The negative τ o implies that the credit card industry makes profits even if we ignore interest income. Table 3 shows that the average spread on credit cards is 3.42 percentage points above breakeven if we ignore transaction cost net of non-interest income and 8.84 percentage points above break-even if we include transaction cost net of non-interest income. This implies a markup of 44-115 percent on the Moody's Aaa rate. The large spreads imply excess profits, which is the third defining feature of the credit card industry. To measure profits, we use a common measure from the literature: average rate of return. The average rate of return for a bank is computed as interest and noninterest income net of charge-offs normalized by assets. That is, suppose that for bank i, assets are given by A i , interest and non-interest income by (r +τ i )A i where r is the cost of funds and τ i is the average spread on the cost of funds, and charge-offs by D i A i where D i is the fraction of banks assets (consumer debt) written-off. Then bank i s return on assets
Excess profits are computed as the difference between the average (asset weighted) return on assets for the 25 large credit card banks and the average (asset weighted) return on assets for all banks. In Table 4 , we report estimates from the literature. It shows the average rate of return on assets for the largest 25 credit card banks are 5.0-7.3 percentage points higher than that of the banking industry. The fourth defining feature of the U.S. credit card industry is antitrust violations. The payment networks and banks have been repeatedly sued for non-competitive practices. Table 5 describes a small sample of U.S. cases which have recently been brought against the credit card payment networks and issuer banks for colluding on prices (interchange fees) and colluding to block entry of new technologies and new competitors.
There are three important cases to highlight. The first case is about collusion. In 2005, several issuing banks and the major payment networks were sued for colluding over interchange fees. They lost the case in 2018 and must pay billions in penalties. While damages have been determined, the second part of this legal proceeding will involve prescribing changes to the way the industry operates in order to avoid further collusion. The second case is about entry barriers. In 2017, a new credit card issuer entrant, Black Card LLC, filed a lawsuit against the major issuers and payment networks for colluding to block entry of their credit card product. The case is currently in progress. The third case is about limiting competition among incumbents. In 2004, the major payment networks were sued for blocking member banks from issuing cards that operated on competing payment networks. They lost three major cases and were ordered to pay billions in penalties in each instance.
In summary, the U.S. credit card industry is characterized by a large degree of market concentration, excess spreads, excess profits, and lawsuits for antitrust violations and noncompetitive behavior. In what follows, we depart from stand competitive models of the consumer credit market and, instead, we model a finite number of non-atomistic credit card firms that issue non-exclusive credit lines. We use the model the quantify the welfare gains and losses from competitive reforms in the credit card industry (since the 1970s and in the future). Our model economy shares many elements with existing general equilibrium, competitive models of consumer credit, in particular Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ríos-Rull (2007) . We build on Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ríos-Rull (2007) by integrating a lender oligopoly that issues credit lines into a production economy with heterogeneous consumers.
Environment
Time is discrete and runs forever (t = 0, 1, . . .). The economy is populated by a unit measure of infinitely-lived heterogeneous consumers, N credit card firms (which we will also refer to as lenders), and a final good firm. Consumers face idiosyncratic earnings and expense shocks. They make savings/borrowing and default/repayment decisions to maximize utility. Lenders imperfectly compete to issue non-exclusive credit lines. The final good firm is perfectly competitive and produces the consumption good using labor and capital as inputs in a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Consumers
Consumers maximize the present value of their flow utility over consumption net of default utility penalties by making savings/borrowing and default/repayment decisions. Let β ∈ (0, 1) denote the discount factor. Let d t be a binary default indicator equal to one if the agent defaults in period t, and 0 otherwise. Consumers maximize the following preferences over non-durable consumption c t net of utility penalties of default χ:
From this point forward, we will ignore time subscripts and focus on a recursive formulation of the problem.
The consumer's idiosyncratic state is given by their credit standing i ∈ {g, b}, earnings shock ∈ R + , expenditure shock z ∈ R + , and net assets a ∈ R. If the consumer is in good credit standing, then i = g, and the consumer may borrow. Otherwise, the consumer is in bad credit standing (i = b) and cannot borrow. The earnings shock is persistent, where E | is the conditional expectation operator over the next period earnings shock given current period earnings shock . The expenditure shock z is non-discretionary, unless the consumer chooses to default. Positive values of a indicate saving, whereas negative value of a indicate borrowing. The state of a consumer is therefore given by the tuple, (i, , z, a).
In order to exposit the consumer's problem, we must briefly discuss the credit card market (more details about the formation of the credit lines appear in Section 3.1.2). If a consumer chooses to borrow, they borrow from a set of credit lines S ∈ (R + , R + ) N . A credit line is a long-term defaultable debt contract that specifies a spread τ ∈ R + and a borrowing limitl ∈ R + . S is the collection of credit line spreads and borrowing limits offered by N lenders. All consumers in good credit standing have access to the same set of credit lines S, and therefore credit lines are non-exclusive. If there are N credit lines, in equilibrium, the consumer will first borrow from the cheapest credit line independent of the lender that issues the credit line. Hence, let j denote the interest rate ranking of a credit line, where j = 1 is the lowest interest rate and j = N is the highest interest rate. For the consumer's problem, the credit lines can be sorted in ascending order with respect to the spreads (τ 1 ≤ τ 2 ≤ . . . τ j ≤ . . . ≤ τ N ) and the corresponding borrowing limits (l 1 ,l 2 , . . . ,l N ), ignoring the issuing credit card firm's identity. Given net assets, a (recall a < 0 implies debt), let a j (a) ≤ 0 denote the balance on credit line with interest rate ranking j ∈ {1, ..., N }:
If net assets are less than or equal to the sum of the borrowing limits on credit lines {1, ..., j}, then the consumer has reached the limit on credit line j. Otherwise, if net assets are greater than the sum of the borrowing limits on credit lines {1, ..., j} and net assets are negative, then the balance on credit line j is a + j−1 k=1l k . If net assets are greater than the sum of the borrowing limits on credit lines {1, ..., j} and if net assets are positive, then the balance on credit line j (and all other credit lines) is zero. Given the set of all credit lines, S = {(τ 1 ,l 1 ), . . . , (τ N ,l N )} ∈ (R + , R + ) N , we define the distribution of consumers across states as Ω(i, , z, a; S) where Ω : {g, b} × R + × R + × R → [0, 1].
Using this notation for credit lines, we now describe the consumer's value functions. Let V (i, , z, a; S) denote the consumer's continuation value at the start of the period. Let V D ( ; S) be the value of default and V R (i, , z, a; S) be the value of repayment. The first choice the consumer makes is between repayment d = 0 and default d = 1:
Given our assumptions about default penalties, default is universal. That is, the consumer repays credit card debt on all credit lines and the expense shock or defaults on all credit lines and the expense shock. The policy functions for repayment/default, consumption, and savings/borrowing -d(·), c(·), a (·) -are functions of (i, , z, a) and S. However, we omit them for ease of exposition. A consumer who defaults, consumes labor earnings and profits, w(S) + Π(S), where w(S) refers to the wage rate and Π(S) refers to the profits uniformly transferred to consumers from credit card firms. Furthermore, the consumer cannot save or borrow (a = 0) and incurs a disutility cost (stigma χ) -only during the default period. In the next period, the consumer may regain good credit standing with probability φ or stay in bad credit standing with probability 1 − φ. The value of default is given by:
A consumer who chooses to repay and is in good credit standing (i = g), may borrow from the set of credit lines or save (a ≥ − N j=1l j ). Furthermore, this consumer retains good credit standing for the next period. The value of repayment when i = g is given by:
a ≥ − N j=1l j A consumer who chooses to repay, but is in bad credit standing (i = b), cannot borrow, but may save (a ≥ 0). Furthermore, the consumer regains good credit standing in the next period with probability φ and stays in bad credit standing with probability 1 − φ. The value of repayment when i = b, is given by:
a ≥0
Note that the budget constraint drops the term N j=1 τ j a j (a) because the consumer in bad credit standing will not hold debt in equilibrium. However, this consumer incurs the expense shock z by choosing to repay.
Lenders
There are N lenders in the economy. Each lender may issue one credit line. Since we restrict our analysis to the case where one credit card firm issues one credit line, if there are N firms, then there are N credit lines. We assume lenders commit to the terms of their lines of credit. Consider lender k ∈ {1, . . . , N } (we will use the convention that superscripted k refers to a lender's identity and does not reflect any ranking of lenders, and subscripted j refers to the interest rate ranking of a lender). Lender k's objective is to choose the terms of their credit line, (τ k ,l k ), to maximize their net present value of profits, π k t , discounted at rate β:
From this point forward, we will omit time subscripts from the lender's problem and focus on the recursive formulation. The ranking of a lender, j, by the interest rate they offer is a key state variable (recall j = 1 is the lowest interest rate and j = N is the highest interest rate). Let τ j andl j denote the interest rate and borrowing limit of the lender offering the j th highest interest rate. The profits resulting from offering the j th highest interest rate are given by Π j (S): Π j (S) = − (1 − d(g, , z, a; S))τ j a j (a) + d(g, , z, a; S)(1 + r(S))a j (a) dΩ(g, , z, a; S)
The first term, −τ j a j (a), captures the gains from repayment, and the second term, (1 + r(S))a j (a), captures the losses from default. 4 Total profits are computed as Π(S) = N j=1 Π j (S), which as mentioned above, are uniformly transferred to consumers. Suppose lender k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N } chooses spread τ k and borrowing limitl k . Let j(τ k , τ −k ) be a function where given τ k and τ −k = (τ 1 , ..., τ k−1 , τ k+1 , ..., τ N ), it gives the rank of τ k when the spreads are sorted in ascending order. Then the set of credit lines can be written S = {(τ j(τ k ,τ −k ) ,l j(τ k ,τ −k ) )} N k=1 and the profits to credit card firm k are given by:
To understand the notation, consider two examples. First, if there is one firm (monopolist), then the monopolist chooses the spread τ 1 and the borrowing limitl 1 to maximize total profits, π 1 (τ 1 ,l 1 ) = Π 1 (τ 1 ,l 1 ) = Π(S), where the first expression refers to profits by the lender's identity, the middle expression refers to profits using the (degenerate) interest rate ranking, and the last expression refers to total profits. Second, if there are two credit card firms and they move sequentially (Stackelberg competition), then firm 2 (the second mover) will pick its spread τ 2 (τ 1 ,l 1 ) and borrowing limitl 2 (τ 1 ,l 1 ) to maximize its profits π 2 (τ 1 ,l 1 , τ 2 ,l 2 ), given firm 1's spread τ 1 and borrowing limitl 1 . Firm 1 will pick its spread and borrowing limit to maximize its profits π 1 (τ 1 ,l 1 , τ 2 (τ 1 ,l 1 ),l 2 (τ 1 ,l 1 )), given firm 2's best response functions τ 2 (τ 1 ,l 1 ) and l 2 (τ 1 ,l 1 ). If, for example, firm 2 sets the lowest interest rate, then j(τ 2 ,l 2 ) = 1. Firm 2's credit line offers the lowest interest rate in the economy and therefore it is ranked first in terms of interest rates. When consumers borrow, they will borrow on firm 2's credit line before borrowing on any other credit line.
Final Good Producer
There is a representative, perfectly competitive firm that produces the final good by hiring labor, L, and renting capital, K, in order to maximize profits:
Factor prices are given by r = α(K/L) α−1 and w = (1 − α)(K/L) α . The firm earns zero profits.
Equilibrium
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is given by a set of credit lines S, a stationary distribution over idiosyncratic states Ω (i, , z, a; S), a wage rate w(S), an interest rate r(S), total profits Π(S), a repayment/default policy function d(i, , z, a; S), a consumption policy function c(i, , z, a; S), a savings/borrowing policy function a (i, , z, a; S), a set of credit card firms' best response functions {τ k (·),l k (·)} N k=1 , and the final good firm's choices for aggregate capital K(S) and aggregate labor L(S) such that:
(i) given S, w(S), r(S), and Π(S), the allocations d(i, , z, a; S), c(i, , z, a; S), and a (i, , z, a; S) solve the consumer's problem in (2), (3), and (4).
(ii) for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, {τ k (·),l k (·)} N k=1 maximizes credit card firm's profits in (6). (iii) final good firm's choices give factor prices r = α(K/L) α−1 and w = (1−α)(K/L) α . (iii) the distribution of consumers Ω(i, , z, a; S) evolves given the policy functions d(i, , z, a; S) and a (i, , z, a; S), and exogenous processces for the earnings shock and expenditure shock z.
(v) labor market clears: d(i, , z, a; S) )z] dΩ (i, , z, a; S) + δK = K α L 1−α
Calibration
We consider two calibrations. A 1970 calibration and a 2016 calibration. Across both calibrations, we hold all parameters constant except for the stigma of default, χ.
We assume that each period corresponds to one year. Table 6 presents the parameters determined outside of the model equilibrium. We use standard estimates for the capital share (α = 0.333), depreciation rate (δ = 0.045), and risk aversion (σ = 2). The re-entry probability of good credit standing φ is chosen such that it takes the average consumer two years to re-enter the credit card market upon default. The idiosyncratic productivity follows a log AR(1) process given by log = ρ log + η . The innovation η is normal, i.i.d., with mean zero and variance σ 2 η . We parameterize this process using estimates from Guvenen et al. (2014) and discretize it using Tauchen (1986) with 100 grid points. We assume that the expense shock takes on two values where z ∈ {z 1 , 0} and z 1 > 0. For z 1 , we compute the top one percentile of out of pocket medical expenses (hospital+ doctor+ prescriptions+ insurance premia) weighted from 2007 to 2013. Hence, by definition, one percent of individuals receive this shock (π z 1 = 0.01). Conditional on receiving the shock, the expense is calibrated, as discussed below. Probability of expense shock 0.010
1970 calibration
In the 1970 calibration, we calibrate the model assuming that there is a single monopolist lender (the monopoly calibration). We calibrate stigma in 1970 (χ 1970 ) to match the average charge-off rate from 1971-75, the earliest 5 years of available charge-off rate data (Ausubel, 1991) . We estimate the stigma of default χ 1970 = 7.82 to match a charge-off rate of 1.95 percent from 1971 to 1975. For the discount rate β and expense shock z 1 , we use the estimates from the 2016 calibration, discussed below. The calibrated parameters are presented in Table 7 .
2016 calibration
In the 2016 calibration, we calibrate the model assuming there are two lenders for tractability (the duopoly calibration), and we hold the parameter estimates constant when analyzing greater degrees of competition. We jointly calibrate the stigma in 2016 (χ 2016 ), discount rate (β), and expense shock (z 1 ) to target the average charge-off rate (FRED, 2012 (FRED, -2016 , average real interest rate (1970-2013, Moody's Aaa yield-Inflation computed using GDP implicit price deflator), and the average out of pocket medical expense (normalized by GDP pc) for those in the top one percentile of the expense distribution (PSID, 2007 (PSID, -2013 . We estimate β = 0.92, which implies a discount rate of 8.6 percent per annum, in order to match the average real interest rate of 4.13 percent per annum. We estimate an expense shock equal to z 1 = 0.74 to match the fact that every year 1 percent of the U.S. population receives an out-of-pocket medical expense shock equal to 37.84 percent of GDP per capita, on average. Lastly, we estimate the stigma of default χ 2016 = 17.06 in order to match a charge-off rate of 3.34 percent per annum in 2016. We interpret the higher default penalty as capturing various innovations in the credit card industry (e.g. Livshits et al. (2010 Livshits et al. ( , 2016 , Drozd and Serrano-Padial (2017) , and many others). 
Results
In this section we compute the distribution of welfare gains as well as the macroeconomic implications under two sets of competitive reforms: (1) reforming the 1970s monopoly into an oligopoly, (ii) reforming the 2016 oligopoly into perfect competition.
Competitive reforms after 1970: monopoly to oligopoly
We begin by analyzing competitive reforms when there is a single monopolist lender (one exclusive credit line), such as in the 1970s. Since this environment is new, we first explore the properties of the monoplist's problem. Figure 1 plots profits to the monopolist (π 1 (τ 1 ,l 1 ) = Π 1 (τ 1 ,l 1 ) = Π(S)) as a function of the spread τ 1 and the borrowing limitl 1 . Note that the monopolist maximizes profits at an interior spread and an interior borrowing limit. This is because if the monopolist chooses a low borrowing limit, profits are low due to less borrowing. If the monopolist chooses a high borrowing limit, then profits are low (or losses are high) due to high default rates. If the monopolist chooses a low spread, then the profit margin is low. If the monopolist chooses a high spread, then consumers will borrow less, leading to low profits. Before discussing the reforms, we show that the model does a reasonable job at approximating several of our key competitiveness indicators. Table 8 compares the credit card market variables from the monopoly model with the limited set of available data in 1970. We targeted the charge-off rate, but not the interest rate spreads. The model accounts for more than half of the interest rate spread and excess spread observed in the data. Given the lower estimates for the excess spread in the model, we view the gains from competitive reforms (discussed below) as conservative estimates. Given the model's success at reproducing key moments, we use the model as a laboratory to study the welfare consequences of reforming the 1970 monopoly into an oligipoly. We begin by comparing steady states, and then we turn to the transition path. Table 9 compares steady state outcomes when there is a monopoly in the 1970s versus a duopoly. We hold parameter values fixed at the 1970 values in this experiment. This experiment is designed to measure the long-run gains associated with the U.S. transition from regional monopolies in the 1970s to current levels of oligopolistic competition. For the case of duopoly, there are two credit lines (one credit line per firm), and they compete in the form of Stackelberg competition. We find that the first mover commits by picking a low borrowing limit (2.50 percent of GDP per capita) and a low spread (2.25 percent). The second mover picks a borrowing limit that is twice that of the first mover (5.29 percent of GDP per capita) and a slightly higher spread (2.36 percent). Hence, the second mover captures a slightly larger share of the market, 56.87 percent of outstanding credit and 52.90 percent of total lender profits.
In terms of credit outcomes, Table 9 shows that total credit increases by more than 50 percent from 0.20 percent of GDP to 0.36 percent of GDP. Table 9 also shows that while the total borrowing limit does not increase much from a monopoly to a duopoly (7.40 percent vs 7.79 percent of GDP per capita), the spread decreases significantly from 5.55 percent to 2.25 percent on the first lender's credit line and 2.36 percent on the second lender's credit line. The excess spread and excess profits also decrease significantly. As we will see below, this generates significant welfare gains among the poor, who previously had to borrow at the higher monopoly interest rate. Table 9 presents the welfare estimates from reforming the 1970 lender monopoly to a duopoly. We use two measures of welfare: consumption equivalent variation (CEV) and wealth equivalent variation (WEV). Consumption equivalent variation is a standard measure that calculates the lifetime increase of consumption in the initial steady state (model with monopolist) such that a consumer is indifferent between the economy with a monopolist and an economy with a duopoly. Wealth equivalent variation calculates the one time transfer that the consumer requires in the initial steady state to be indifferent between the economy with a monopolist and an economy with a duopoly. Wealth equivalent variation is our preferred measure because it allows for aggregation across consumers and takes into account that consumers re-optimize on their decisions given the onetime transfer. Following Conesa et al. (2018) , it is calculated as follows:
where V 0 (i, , z, a + W EV ) refers to the value at the initial steady state (monopolist) given a onetime transfer of W EV , V t (i, , z, a) refers to the value in period t along the transition path, andl 1 refers to the borrowing limit in the initial steady state (borrowing limit picked by the monopolist). The last two inequalities ensure that the minimization problem is well defined. The welfare gains from competitive reforms range from a lifetime increase in con-sumption of 0.35-0.36 percent for an unborn consumer. The gains to the same consumer, measured in units of a onetime transfer range from 0.98-1.01 percent of initial GDP pc. The lower spreads are key for the welfare gains because the increase in the total borrowing limit is small. When we take the transition into account, note that the gains are slightly higher. Finally, Table 9 shows that the aggregate welfare gain to the current cohort is equivalent to a onetime transfer of 0.81 percent of initial GDP. Furthermore, almost every consumer (99.95 percent of total population) is better off with the transition to a duopoly. Before decomposing the welfare gains, we first discuss the implications for the interest rate, wage rate, profits to GDP, credit to GDP, default rate, and charge-off rate along the transition path. In Figure 2 , we plot the transition path where in period 1, the economy switches from a monopoly to a duopoly. With a lower spread and a higher total borrowing limit, consumers have a lower precautionary savings motive. This leads to lower aggregate savings (equal to capital K) resulting in a higher interest rate and a lower wage rate (Figures 2a and 2b) . Profits increase initially along the transition path, subsequently they decrease to a a lower value (Figure 2c) . Given a lower spread, consumers borrow more, but do not default more (Figures 2d and 2e) . This leads to a lower charge-off rate (Figure 2f ).
Thus far, we have estimated the aggregate welfare gains and showed that almost 100 percent of the population is better off. Now we turn to a discussion of the distribution of welfare gains from competitive reforms. This is illustrated in Figure 3 . The first subfigure plots the welfare gains (in units of the one time transfer normalized by initial GDP pc) for consumers with the lowest, highest, and median earnings shock (and no expense shock) as a function of net assets. We see that consumers with the lowest earnings shock and low net assets are better off due to the lower spread and higher borrowing limit. We also see that consumers with the highest earnings shock and high net assets are also better off. This is because these consumers benefit from a higher savings interest rate. Finally, consumers with a median earnings shock are better off, but not as much as those with the lowest earnings shock and low assets or those with the highest earnings shock and high assets. This is because consumers with a median earnings shock do not benefit as much from the increased ability to borrow more at a cheaper rate and does not benefit as much from a higher savings interest rate. This mechanism is reflected in the second sub-figure, which plots the distribution of welfare gains by earnings and wealth deciles. We see that the consumers with the lowest earnings or wealth and the consumers with the highest earnings or wealth are the ones who benefit the most from competitive reforms. Notes: the initial steady state (year=0) is a monopoly. In year 1, the economy unexpectedly transitions to a duopoly. We assume perfect foresight for subsequent periods. Notes: welfare gains from the transition are measured using wealth equivalent variation (one-time transfer that yields gains of reform from monopoly to duopoly) and expressed as a percent of GDP per capita. The measure is defined in equation 7.
Competitive reforms after 2016: oligopoly to perfect competition
Thus far, we analyzed the implications of the U.S. credit card industry experiencing competitive reforms from the 1970 monopoly to oligopoly. Now we analyze competitive reforms from the 2016 oligopoly to perfect competition.
We begin by showing that our 2016 calibration does well at capturing several of our key competitiveness indicators. Table 10 shows that we account for almost all of the total borrowing limit and more than half of the spread. We also account for 40 percent of the excess spread and excess profits. Again, given the lower estimates for excess spreads and excess profits in the model compared to data, we view the gains from competitive reforms as conservative estimates. Table 11 compares steady state outcomes when there is a duopoly in 2016 versus perfect competition. We hold parameter values fixed at the 2016 values in this experiment. In the case of a duopoly, given that firm 2 (second mover) could always undercut firm 1 (first mover) with a lower spread, firm 1 commits to a low borrowing limit and a low spread. In response, firm 2 chooses a high borrowing limit and a high spread. We also see this in the market share with respect to outstanding credit and profits, where firm 1 has 37.94 percent and 22.01 percent of the market share, respectively. Compared to the 1970 duopoly, the duopoly in 2016 generates significantly higher profits. What differs between the two calibrations is the value of the stigma default penalty χ, which is significantly higher in the 2016 calibration. This allows lenders to charge higher spreads and offer greater borrowing limits without generating more defaults since the stigma cost of default is higher.
To measure the welfare losses from oligopoly in the credit market, we must define the perfect competition counterfactual. Our benchmark definition of perfect competition is an economy in which we hold the number of lenders fixed and assume that they compete non-strategically on limits and spreads until each lender's profit is zero. However, there are an indeterminate number of combinations of borrowing limits and spreads that yield zero profits. Our selection criteria is to choose the combination of borrowing limits and spreads that maximize the welfare of an unborn agent with zero net assets, subject to weakly positive profits on all credit lines.
Using this definition of perfect competition, Table 11 reports key credit market variables. Under perfect competition, the total borrowing limit nearly doubles, and we observed an approximately 35 percent reduction in the spreads on both credit lines. Hence, total credit increases threefold, going from 0.61 to 2.07 percent of GDP. The higher borrowing limit leads to a higher charge-off rate and default rate, however. Lastly, by construction, profits decrease to zero. Table 11 also presents the welfare estimates from reforming the 2016 lender oligopoly to perfect competition. The welfare gains, on average, are large for both an unborn agent and the current cohort. The lifetime consumption gains for unborn agents are 1.84 percent and 1.95 percent across steady states and along the transition path, respectively. We also compute the one time transfers equivalent to gains from competitive reforms for unborn agents. We find that the gains to unborn agents are equivalent to one time transfers of 5.59 percent and 6.02 percent in steady state and along the transition path, respectively. Among the agents that are currently living in 2016 levels of credit market competition, the gains are equivalent to a one time transfer worth 3.36 percent of GDP. Furthermore, every consumer is weakly better off with the transition. Figure 4 plots the transition from the 2016 lender duopoly to perfect competition. In this case also the interest rate increases and the wage rate decreases, but the magnitudes are significantly larger compared to the 1970s reform (monopoly to duopoly) discussed in the previous subsection. Credit increases monotonically. Both the default rate and the charge-off rate decrease initially because consumers delay default, however, subsequently they increase to a higher steady state level. As a result, lender profits initially rise as defaults fall, but in the long run, as defaults rise, lender profits decline and then asymptote to zero. Figure 5 decomposes the welfare gains from further competitive reforms. While the implications are qualitatively similar to those discussed in the previous subsection, the magnitudes are larger. The wealth-equivalent gains to consumers in the lowest deciles of the earnings and wealth distributions are equivalent to a one time transfer worth 6.66 and 6.83 percent of GDP per capita, respectively. The wealth-equivalent gains to the highest deciles of the earnings and wealth distributions are equivalent to a onetime transfer worth 5.23 and 7.06 percent of GDP per capita, respectively. Similar to the 1970s reform, lowincome and low-wealth consumers benefit from the ability to borrow more at a cheaper rate, and savers now receive a higher interest rate because of general equilibrium effects. Because of the significant expansion of limits and lowering of borrowing rates, we find that this reform is Pareto improving both across steady states as well as along the transition path (as shown in the last line of Table 11 ). Notes: the initial steady state (year=0) is a duopoly. In year 1, the economy unexpectedly transitions to a perfect competition. We assume perfect foresight for subsequent periods. Notes: welfare gains from the transition are measured using wealth equivalent variation (one-time transfer that yields gains of reform from duopoly to perfect competition) and expressed as a percent of GDP per capita. The measure is defined in equation 7.
Conclusion
The U.S. credit card industry is characterized by a large degree of market concentration, excess spreads, and excess return on assets (abnormal profits) relative to the banking industry. However, workhorse consumer credit models assume atomistic zeroprofit lenders. We relax this assumption and propose a new model that incorporates imperfect competition in the credit market. Our model accounts for roughly half the excess spreads and abnormal profits observed in the data. Furthermore, we find that welfare gains from competitive reforms in this industry are equivalent to a onetime transfer of approximately 3.36 percent of GDP to the current population. Those with the lowest earnings or net assets are better off due to increased borrowing limits and decreased spreads. Those with the highest earnings or net assets are better off due to a higher savings interest rate.
Our model yields several policy implications. Lender market power harms all households across the income and wealth spectrum. This result implies that reforms which promote credit market competition would pass unanimously in the U.S. and yield significant welfare gains to all current and future cohorts of households. Likewise, efforts to increase competitiveness and prevent collusion between issuers and banks, such as increased antitrust enforcement, would also yield significant welfare gains to all current and future cohorts of households.
